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INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-first century, wars are not declared or waged conventionally;
instead, conflicts are instigated by clandestine agents using military, nonmilitary, media, 1 cyber tools, information operations, NGOs, nonstate actors,
intelligence agencies, economic tools, propaganda,2 ambiguity,3 terrorism,4 and
insurgency or rebel movements.5 In hybrid warfare, the lines between peacetime
and wartime 6 and between combatants and civilians 7 are blurred. Further,
systemic aggression is imposed on the targeted state using gray zones,8 nonlinear
warfare, unrestricted warfare,9 unconventional warfare, and color revolutions to
avoid attribution and possible retribution against the aggressor.
The threat posed by hybrid warfare is real.10 Hybrid warfare employs a wide
array of power tools, including: political, economic, military, asymmetric, civil.
Additionally, it includes informational tools such as: diplomacy, terrorism,
proxies, and economic attacks to persuade populations or to divide societies.11
Hybrid warfare targets the vulnerabilities of a society and system while
deliberately exploiting ambiguity to avoid detection. It is usually detected only
when it is fully functional and capable of inflicting harm.12 Some researchers
believe that lawfare (in which law is used as a tool of aggression) is also a branch
of hybrid warfare.13 However, it can also be argued that lawfare has a domain of
its own. For example, geopolitically, Russia is mirroring Western lawfare
threats.14 By contrast, hybrid warfare operations are employed by nations around
the world. Presently, the most notable effects of hybrid wars can be seen in Syria,
Ukraine, and Hong Kong. There are a plethora of cases where an aggressor using

1
James K. Wither, Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare, 15 CONNECTIONS: Q. J. 73, 76
(2016), https://connections-qj.org/article/making-sense-hybrid-warfare [hereinafter Wither].
2
Karl Hickman et al., Conference Proceeding at the Swedish Defence University: Hybrid
Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: What to Do? 15, 20–21 (Feb. 2018).
3
DR. PATRICK J. CULLEN & ERIK REICHBORN-KJENNERUD, MCDC COUNTERING HYBRID
WARFARE PROJECT: UNDERSTANDING HYBRID WARFARE 12 (Jan. 2017); See also COLONEL
BERND HORN, ON HYBRID WARFARE 16 (Dr. Emily Spencer eds., 2016) [hereinafter HORN].
4
Manon van Tienhoven, Identifying ‘Hybrid Warfare’ 13 (2016) (unpublished Master in
Public Administration thesis, Leiden University) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Tienhoven].
5
See VIKRANT DESHPANDE & SHIBANI MEHTA, Contextualising Hybrid Warfare, in
HYBRID WARFARE: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 26–28 (Vikrant Deshpande ed.,
2018) [hereinafter DESHPANDE & MEHTA].
6
See Wither, supra note 1, at 74.
7
See Hickman, supra note 2, at 5.
8
See HORN, supra note 3, at 12–14.
9
See DESHPANDE & MEHTA, supra note 5, at 29–32.
10
JAN JAKUB UZIĘBŁO, UNITED IN AMBIGUITY? EU AND NATO APPROACHES TO HYBRID
WARFARE AND HYBRID THREATS 4 (Bassotti et al. eds., May 2017) [hereinafter UZIĘBŁO].
11
ROBERT JOHNSON, The Evolution of Hybrid Threats Through History, in SHIFTING
PARADIGM OF WAR: HYBRID WARFARE 3–5 (Yücel Özel & Ertan İnaltekin eds., 2017).
12
See CULLEN, supra note 3, at 10.
13
See Hickman, supra note 2, at 18.
14
Id.
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hybrid warfare has either admitted its involvement in the hybrid operations or
declassified its plans for hybrid wars.
Pakistan is a victim of hybrid warfare. Thus, Pakistan is incentivized to
understand hybrid warfare to learn how it has been attacked historically. Also,
comprehending hybrid warfare will help Pakistan grasp why it is destabilized in
the present. Finally, understanding this type of warfare will mitigate future
attacks against Pakistan.15 Therefore, Pakistan must learn about its weaknesses,
such as its vulnerabilities related to the CPEC, blasphemy, “ethnic, religious,
and geographical difference,” and socioeconomic problems that can be exploited
by a hybrid warfare aggressor, who may use color revolutions and
unconventional warfare to disrupt, control, or influence the regime or system to
satisfy its geostrategic interests. 16 As a response to hybrid warfare, nations
should follow three steps: detect, deter, and respond.17
This Article has five Parts. Part I defines hybrid warfare. It includes hybrid
warfare definitions by John McCuen, NATO, and Frank Hoffman. Part II then
describes the theoretical framework of hybrid warfare. This Part has 11 subparts.
Part II(A) explains the theory of global dominance in respect to hybrid warfare
planning. Part II(B) demonstrates the Russian stance on hybrid warfare in
geopolitics. Part II(C) defines Lind’s predictions regarding compound and
hybrid threats. Part II(D) explains the pillars of hybrid warfare, which include
color revolutions and unconventional warfare. Part II(E) explains Warden’s five
rings as targets of hybrid warfare. Part II(F) explains Hart’s theory of indirect
warfare in relation to hybrid warfare. Part II(G) explores John Boyd’s OODA
loop theory. Part II(H) explains chaos theory in relation to hybrid warfare. Part
II(I) describes the United States’ full spectrum dominance strategy in hybrid
warfare. Part II(J) describes the notion of insurgency in accordance with a leaked
U.S. field manual for creating or fighting an insurgency. Finally, Part II(K)
explains the theory of leading from behind under hybrid warfare.
Thereafter, Part III provides a list of tools that are essential to a hybrid
warfare toolkit. After listing the elements and tools of hybrid warfare, Part III(A)
explains the role of propaganda in hybrid warfare. Part III(B) defines the role of
funding and cyberattacks in hybrid warfare. Part III(C) explores the role of
proxies in hybrid warfare. Part VI gives a list of case studies and false flag
attacks planned or executed in hybrid warfare, where aggressors have either
admitted to their plans and activities or were apprehended during the act. This
Part includes details and summaries of hybrid warfare cases, attacks, and
operations that are admitted by Russia, the United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey,
Indonesia, Macedonia, Italy, and the U.S. Finally, Part V discusses the strategies
and recommendations for fighting or responding to hybrid threats. This segment
contains a discussion of the elements of detecting, deterring, and responding to
hybrid threats.

15

ANDREW KORYBKO, APPLICABILITY OF HYBRID WARFARE TO PAKISTAN:
AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES 207–08 (People’s Friendship U. of Russ. ed., 2015).
16

CHALLENGES

See id. at 208–21.
SEAN MONAGHAN, DR. PATRICK CULLEN & DR. NJORD WEGGE, MCDC COUNTERING
HYBRID WARFARE PROJECT: COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE 3–4 (Mar. 2019) [hereinafter
MONAGHAN].
17
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I. DEFINING HYBRID WARFARE

Hybrid warfare has been defined a number of times. Most of the definitions
revolve around actors, tactics, dynamism, complexity, ambiguity,
simultaneity,18 and the avoidance of attribution and retribution. NATO views
hybrid warfare as a kind of warfare that uses conventional and unconventional
means, propaganda, misinformation, proxies, and psychological operations in a
targeted state.19
A. JOHN MCCUEN’S DEFINITION
John J. McCuen, in his 2008 paper “Hybrid Wars,” describes hybrid warfare
as “spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a
struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and
support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home
fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international
community.” 20 McCuen sees hybrid warfare as using a variety of tools to
persuade the domestic population of a targeted state.
B. NATO’S DEFINITION
There is no official definition of hybrid warfare by NATO; however, it has
defined hybrid warfare in its public pronouncements as
warfare . . . where a wide range of overt and covert military,
paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly
integrated design. The adversary tries to influence influential
policymakers and key decision makers by combining kinetic
operations with subversive effort. The aggressor often resorts to
clandestine actions, to avoid attribution and retribution.21
NATO sees hybrid warfare as a range of clandestine efforts to influence
policymakers and key players in a targeted state while avoiding attribution and
retribution.

18

See UZIĘBŁO, supra note 10, at 7.
See id. at 14–15.
20
See GURMEET KANWAL, The Changing Character and the Taxonomy of Conflict, in
HYBRID WARFARE: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 16 (Vikrant Deshpande ed.,
2018) [hereinafter KANWAL] (quoting John J. McCuen, ‘Hybrid Wars’, in MIL. REV. 107, 108
(Mar.-Apr. 2008)).
21
Brigadier General Nadeem Ashraf, The Pursuit of Hybrid Warfare: Muddling Towards
Clarity and Implementation 7 (Jan. 4, 2017) (unpublished strategy research report, on file with
the U.S. Army War College) [hereinafter Ashraf] (quoting Katie Abbott, Understanding and
Countering Hybrid Warfare: Next Steps for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 8 (Mar.
23, 2016) (research paper, University of Ottawa); See also Security: EU Strengthens Response
to Hybrid Threats, EURO. COMMISSION (Apr. 6, 2016); Andrés B. Muñoz et al., Articles on
NATO Current Challenges, 37 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 5, 11, 25 (Oct. 2016).
19
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C. FRANK HOFFMAN’S DEFINITION
W. Nemeth coined the term “hybrid warfare” in 2002 to describe the
existence of hybrid threats,22 while Frank Hoffman established the use of the
term to refer to post-Cold War conflicts.23 Hoffman describes hybrid warfare as
the employment of a full spectrum of tools, tactics, and coercions.24 He believes
that hybrid threats incorporate
a full range of different modes of warfare including
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations,
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion,
and criminal disorder. Hybrid wars can be conducted by both
states and a variety of nonstate actors. These multi-modal
activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the
same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed
and coordinated within the main battle space to achieve
synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions
of the conflict. These effects can be gained at all levels of war.25
Hoffman also refers to hybrid warfare as compound warfare. He explains
that in compound warfare, regular and irregular forces are used in a unified
direction.26 He describes compound warfare as
wars that had significant regular and irregular components
fighting simultaneously under unified direction. … Compound
wars offered synergy and combinations at the strategic level,
but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we anticipate
at the operational and even tactical levels in wars where one or
both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and
modes of conflict in the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of
compound wars operated largely as distraction or economy of
force measures in a separate theatre or adjacent operating area
including the rear echelon. Because, it is based on operationally
separate forces, the compound concept did not capture the
merger or blurring modes of war identified in past case studies
such as Hezbollah in the second Lebanon war of 2006.27

22

See UZIĘBŁO, supra note 10, at 5.
Graham Fairclough, The Mouse, the Tank and the Competitive Market: A New View of
Hybrid War, in SHIFTING PARADIGM OF WAR: HYBRID WARFARE 9 (Yücel Özel & Ertan
İnaltekin eds., 2017).
24
FRANK G. HOFFMAN, CONFLICT IN 21ST CENTURY: THE RISE OF HYBRID WARS 8
(Potomac Inst. for Pol’y Stud. ed., 2007) [hereinafter HOFFMAN].
25
See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 8. See also Ashraf, supra note 21, at 5; HORN, supra
note 3, at 8–9.
26
See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 20.
27
See KANWAL, supra note 20, at 17. See also Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and
Challenges, 52 JOINT FORCES Q. 36 (1st Quarter, 2009).
23
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Overall, the key objectives for hybrid warfare are to avoid direct
confrontation, to destabilize a targeted state, and to hinder its policymaking.28 In
this regard, a full spectrum of tools is employed to introduce chaos and
ambiguity to spread confusion, while avoiding attribution and retribution against
the perpetrators.29 All efforts are synchronized to either change a regime or to
influence or coerce it into conditions that are favorable to the aggressor.30
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF HYBRID WARFARE

A Chinese military strategy analyst, Sun Tzu, noted thousands of years ago
that the most efficient way to fight an enemy is to break his resistance indirectly
without actual fighting.31 In this way, a nation saves the resources that could
have been exhausted in a direct confrontation, while it uses its resources to fight
an irregular war. Moreover, indirect warfare destabilizes the enemy and puts it
in a defensive position, making it vulnerable to other attacks.32
At present, all of the superpowers of this world (including the U.S., Russia,
and China) have nuclear capabilities; for this reason, conventional warfare is not
an option for these nations. Moreover, the costs and expenditure involved in
fighting conventionally are too high. For instance, the U.S. has spent more than
760 billion USD in its war in Afghanistan,33 and the end is nowhere in sight.
Therefore, hybrid warfare and clandestine ways of waging wars are gaining
ground as attractive options for destabilizing an enemy without exhausting many
resources.
In the past, conventional wars were fought with missiles, fighter jets, bombs,
and soldiers. Currently, hybrid warfare is indicated by attempts at regime
change, soft coups, color revolutions, rising anti-state rebels, insurgents,
“nonstate actors guised among civilians,” spies, “propaganda in media and social
media,” surgical strikes, and proxy fights.34 These hybrid warfare tactics not
only enable an aggressor to use nonmilitary forces against a targeted state
without being held accountable in accordance with the rules of international law;
they also allow it to destabilize a target without exhausting many resources or
disturbing their political relations.

28
Gergana Mitalova, Comprehensive Institutional Approach to Developing Capabilities
to Counter Hybrid Threats: Legal and Doctrinal Limitations, 39 INFO. & SECURITY: AN INT’L
J. 127, 132. (2018); See also Ashraf, supra note 21, at 8.
29
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, JOE 2035: THE JOINT FORCE
IN A CONTESTED AND DISORDERED WORLD 6 (2016); See also Zdzisław Śliwa et al., Russian
Ambitions and Hybrid Modes of Warfare, 7 Est. J. of Mil. Stud. 86, 96 (2018); See also Ashraf,
supra note 21, at 8.
30
See also Ashraf, supra note 21, at 11.
31
SUN TZU, Attack by Stratagem, in ON THE ART OF WAR 8–12 (2000) (c. 500 B.C.E.)
(ebook).
32
ANDREW KORYBKO, HYBRID WARS: THE INDIRECT ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO REGIME
CHANGE 9 (People’s Friendship U. of Russ. ed., 2015) [hereinafter KORYBKO].
33
Reality Check Team, Afghanistan war: What has the conflict cost the US?, BBC (Feb.
28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821.
34
See KORYBKO, supra note 32, at 8-10.
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A. GLOBAL DOMINANCE THEORY
In 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan developed a theory in his work The Influence
of Sea Power Upon History, in which he said that if certain regions of the sea
are controlled by a power, its effects can influence other parts of the world.35
His works have since influenced U.S. policies and naval strategies. In 1904, in
the paper “The Geographical Pivot of the History,” Halford Mackinder
developed Mahan’s work and applied it to certain geographical locations.36 He
referred to these intrinsic areas as “the Heartland.” Today these areas are Russia
and Central Asia. 37 Mackinder theorized that control over the Heartland
translated into control of the “World Island of Eurasia.” Furthermore, he argued
that Eastern Europe was the gateway to this Heartland. Mackinder wrote in 1919
that “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland
commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the
World.”38 However, if we critically evaluate these two strategies for gaining
global dominance, geographically, each differs tremendously from the other.
Later, Jozef Pilsudski, a Polish leader, proposed that fracturing non-Russian
states into different ethnic groups by externally influencing a rebellion against
the Russian center could possibly defeat Russia. 39 Ultimately, Poland was
unsuccessful in executing this plan. However, Pilsudski pioneered the idea of
destabilizing a nation by creating a rebellion against the center state and by
diving the nation into different ethnic groups. This idea was later used by others.
Great Britain applied a similar theoretical framework of “destabilizing a nation
by dividing it into religious identities” to rule in pre-partition Hindustan through
the East India Company. In Hindustan (present-day India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh), the British divided a nation into two different religious groups:
Hindus and Muslims. This hybrid operation is referred to as the “divide and
rule”40 theory. If we look at the present-day effects of the successful application
of this theory, India and Pakistan are still arch-nemeses, fighting over their
differences in religious beliefs as different identities that cannot make peace with

35

A. T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY 1660-1783, 28 (2007)
(ebook).
36
Sir Halford J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of the History (1904), 170
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 298, 300–321 (Dec. 2004).
37
See KORYBKO, supra note 32, at 14–15.
38
SIR HALFORD J. MACKINDER, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY: A STUDY IN THE
POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, xviii, 106 (Nat’l Def. U. Press ed., 1942); See also ELDAR
ISMAILOV & VLADIMER PAPAVA, The Heartland Theory and the Present-Day Geopolitical
Structure of Central Eurasia, in RETHINKING CENTRAL EURASIA 84, 86 (Cent. Asia-Caucasus
Inst. & Silk Road Stud. Program ed., 2010); See also Matt Rosenberg, What Is Mackinder's
Heartland Theory?, THOUGHTCO., (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/what-ismackinders-heartland-theory-4068393.
39
Predmetsky Rosenborg, Geopolitics of Eurasia: A Brief Introduction, MEDIUM (Sept.
7,
2019),
https://medium.com/@predmetskyrosenborg/geopolitics-of-eurasia-a-briefintroduction-429ed796a64b (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). See also Jacek Reginia-Zacharski,
Ukrainian Issues in Geopolitical Thought of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 18
INT’L STUD. INTERDISC. POL. & CULTURAL J. 5, 18–19 (2016).
40
Shashi Tharoor, The Partition: The British Game of “Divide and Rule”, AL JAZEERA
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/partition-british-gamedivide-rule-170808101655163.html.
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each other, while both of them still praise and look up to the United Kingdom
(the invader) as an ideal.
After Pilsudski, Nicholas Spykman used Mackinder’s crescents (the Inner
Crescent: Europe and Southern, Southwestern, and Eastern Asia; the Outer
Crescent: Britain, South and North America, Southern Africa, Australasia, and
Japan)41 and referred to these collectively as Rimland. Spykman believed that
the Rimland (Asia Minor, Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, South East Asia, China,
Korea, and East Siberia, excluding Russia) was more important than the
Heartland because of its growing industries and manpower, and said that “Who
controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of
the world.”42
Later, Saul Cohen added to Spykman’s analysis of the Rimland and
established that geopolitically, the Shatterbelts region is more prone to conflicts;
this is the region where most of the world powers are fighting to protect their
interests because of the Shatterbelts’ diverse characteristics. 43 This was
identified by Cohen as present-day Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia.44 More recently, in 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book The
Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, used
Pilsudski’s peripheral destabilization and the ideas of Rimland and Shatterbelts
to describe how the United States can keep its dominion over the world by
exploiting the “Eurasian Balkans.”45 He noted
[the] Eurasian Balkans form the inner core of that oblong
(portions of southeastern Europe, Central Asia and parts of
South Asia, the Persian Gulf area, and the Middle East). . . [and]
not only are its political entities unstable, but they tempt and
invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom
is determined to oppose the region’s dominion by another. It is
this familiar combination of a power vacuum and power suction
that justifies the appellation Eurasian Balkans.46
In sum, Mackinder identified Russia as at the center of the Heartland of the
World Island. In turn, Cohen and Spykman located its vulnerabilities. Pilsudski
provided methods to break it up through destabilization, and Brzezinski used all
of these learnings to provide a geostrategy for the U.S. to maintain its
dominance. Thus, Korybko is of the view that the American strategy is to
penetrate the Russian core through destabilization to retain its global hegemonic
dominance. 47 For Korybko, the American strategy for destabilizing cores in

41

Ismailov & Papava, supra note 38, at 85.
NICHOLAS JOHN SPYKMAN, AMERICA’S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER xxvii (2007).
43
SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM 43–44 (2003) [hereinafter
COHEN].
44
See id. at 43–44.
45
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS
GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES 133 (1997).
46
Id. at 123–124.
47
See KORYBKO, supra note 32, at 18.
42
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Eurasia is not to repeat its experience in Libya for financial and political reasons.
Instead, it aims to destabilize peripheral states like Kazakhstan and Ukraine
through civil conflicts, regime change movements, and insurgencies or
antigovernment movements through propaganda.48 For example, it should not
be a surprise to discover eventually that the anti-China rebellion in Hong Kong
is funded or fueled by Western powers to serve their strategic interests and to
maintain global dominance. In these strategies, the introduction of chaos ensures
an attack on the targeted society and the success of the aggressor in hybrid
warfare. Such destabilization creates a deadlock for a targeted state putting it
into a strategic defensive position.49
B. THE RUSSIAN STANCE
Korybko has noted that, usually, in hybrid war operations, humanitarian
intervention or the responsibility to protect are not employed because they use
the conventional use of force to destabilize nations and they do not serve the
interests of the perpetrator superpower’s interests. However, he theorized that,
in our complex geopolitics, operations are more likely to be conventional when
they are distant from the real core targets of the U.S.—Russia, China, and Iran—
and are more likely to be unconventional when moving toward these core
states.50 For example, since Libya was politically distant from Iran and Russia,
direct means to change the regime were used, and, because Syria was politically
closer to Russia and Iran, indirect means (e.g., color revolutions and
unconventional means) to change its regime were employed.51 Russia is more of
a core target than Iran; therefore, in the future, it is expected that the environment
in Ukraine will more closely resemble the Syrian situation. However, it is
pertinent to note that the key goal of an adaptive approach for the U.S. is to
achieve the Libyan outcome in Ukraine.52
By contrast, Korybko’s analysis of this theoretical framework is so centered
on Russia as a core target of American strategies for destabilization that it misses
out on other global powers that are gaining ground for global dominance, such
as China. It also lacks any insight into the destabilization and liberalization
strategies or installation of puppet governments in oil-rich countries, such as
Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Korybko’s analysis of Syria serves only one dimension
of the American interest in destabilizing Russia, while it misses the financial
benefits of dominating oil-rich countries and the U.S.’s wider relationship with
the Muslim world and its political relationship with Israel. Similarly, while
Korybko also sees China as a core target of the U.S., he does not provide any
helpful analysis of U.S. global strategies to retain its global dominance in respect
to China’s Silk Road project or its ally Pakistan.

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id. at 11.
51
Id.
52
Id.
49
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C. LIND’S PREDICTIONS
In 1989, William Lind proposed that the next generation of warfare will be
more fluid, decentralized, and asymmetrical by using nonstate actors. 53 Lind
also predicted that information warfare and psychological operations will
replace conventional methodology of fighting a war. Lind said, “Psychological
operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the
form of media [or] information intervention… A major target will be the enemy
population’s support of its government and the war. Television news may
become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.”54 Lind
correctly predicted the rise of unconventional warfare and misinformation or
antigovernment propaganda. Lind also anticipated the blurring of the line
between civilian and military through the use of nonstate actors—utilized today
in hybrid warfare through unconventional warfare and color revolutions.
D. PILLARS OF HYBRID WARFARE
Hybrid warfare comprises two basic pillars: color revolutions and
unconventional warfare. Part II(D)(1) will explain color revolutions and Part
II(D)(2) will discuss unconventional warfare.
1. Color Revolutions
In color revolutions, psychological operations, information operations, and
propaganda are employed to convey a designed (usually anti-government)
message to mass audiences. 55 At this stage of hybrid warfare, many
characteristics are identifiable: (1) the vulnerabilities of a society or state are
targeted, (2) networks are developed, (3) the media and other information outlets
are positioned to influence targeted masses, (4) local separatist movements are
supported, (5) politicians and other key establishment actors are bribed, (6)
dissatisfaction with central authorities is induced, (7) local oligarchs and armed
bands are contracted, (8) anti-state interest movements, marches, or protests are
designed and commenced, (9) infrastructure and institutions are targeted and
violence is provoked, (10) misinformation and psychological operations are
started, (11) monopolies in the media are established and domestic conventional
forces are disabled, and (12) parallel sovereignty and a parallel state are
erected.56
The chief purpose of such activities is to destabilize the government and to
influence the regime or subvert the authority of a chosen government. This
message instigates violence and convinces its participants to fight against the
system, which is also referred to as ‘neocortical warfare.’ The higher the number
of its participants, the higher the chances of its success. In order to recruit more

53
William S. Lind et al., The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, MARINE
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participants, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are exploited
as network-centric warfare, which also enables the movement to spread the
manufactured virus deep in the roots of a system and among the general public’s
subconsciousness. The affected population behaves like a swarming hive,
manipulated as weaponized chaos and used to destabilize a targeted state in the
form of rebellion, insurgency, and revolutions.57 The destabilization of Syria and
the Arab Spring are examples of such color revolutions. 58 Color revolution
techniques involve public movements, protests, marches, social or civil
disobedience, boycotts, anti-corruption movements, anti-state movements,
nonviolent seizures, parallel sovereignty and government claims, state mocking,
false identities, and guerilla warfare. In addition to these nonviolent techniques,
violent unconventional techniques can also be used by insurgents or rebels.59
2. Unconventional Warfare
Unconventional warfare is the next stage of color revolutions. In this stage,
terrorism and unpredictable force are used, key government institutions are
disabled, the territories of a state are occupied, armed forces are prominently
positioned, and guerrilla warfare is commenced against a targeted state.60 The
main aim of such activities is to influence the regime of the targeted state by
employing nonstate actors or to destabilize a state. For instance, during protests
by these movements, it is easy to introduce undercover agents of nonstate actors
to instigate protesters into violence. Some of the most renowned uses of nonstate
actors involve their employment as mercenaries, terrorists, and anti-state
rebels. 61 These nonstate actors use Warden’s five rings, Hart’s indirect
approach, Boyd’s OODA loop, and the chaos theory to paralyze a targeted
victim.62
It is difficult for law enforcement authorities of a targeted state to identify
the place and time of such violence, owing to its ambiguity. By contrast, during
identified instances of violence, international and domestic media are controlled
in a way to only highlight the casualties and injuries caused as collateral damage
by a victim state in its efforts to restrain violence and ensure security. A
government, in making such efforts, is painted as a draconian human rights
abuser, as a means to increase political support among the international
community to change the regime of the targeted state. 63 The leaked U.S.
Government Agencies paper, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 2010,
known as TC 18-01, can be seen as a field manual of unconventional warfare. It
prescribes and describes detailed ways of how unconventional warfare is
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planned, managed, and executed using social media platforms.64 Compared to
color revolutions, unconventional warfare is more expensive and violent. 65
Notable examples of such unconventional warfare are the Ukrainian coup, the
EuroMaidan coup, and the Syrian War, and it is predicted that such movements
will continue to be planned and executed in the future.66
E. WARDEN’S FIVE RINGS
Colonel John Warden theorized that in a clandestine war against a target
state, there are five target levels stacked in layers upon each other. At the very
core is (1) the leadership of a country. Beyond this level are (2) system
essentials, (3) infrastructure, and (4) the population. The outermost layer is (5)
fielded military.67 Warden sees all these targets in an enemy state as a bullseye
target. He says that the closer you hit to the core of these targets, the more
benefits you gain.68 For instance, if you hit the leadership, the ripple effects will
felt at the population level. But, if for example, you hit the fielded military, then
infrastructure will not be affected.69
Warden believed that the centers of gravity (COGs) can be located in any
target, and these COGs can be found at operational and strategic levels. For
example, the COG for infrastructure can be roads. However, all five rings must
be targeted in an enemy state to get the best results, with the “leadership as its
core” and the “outer layers” proximity with the core depicting the importance of
that target.70
For convenience and effectiveness, population, infrastructure, and system
essentials are the main targets in unconventional warfare and color revolutions,
whereas the outermost layer—fielded military—and the innermost layer—
leadership—are often seen as difficult targets, because of a desire to avoid direct
confrontation. Nonetheless, the main goal of targeting leadership remains intact.
For instance, color revolutions target societies to instigate destabilization. When
a population is instigated into a rebellion or insurgency, it overpowers the
institutions and then tries to strike at the core of the system, i.e., its leadership.
In this situation, if the leadership chooses to defend itself through fielded
military or police forces, a goal is partially achieved. As a result, a civil conflict
between the insurgency and the governmental forces will erupt, destabilizing the
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nation. By contrast, if the leadership does not choose to fight the insurgency and
steps down, the regime is changed in the form of a puppet government favored
by the instigator, accomplishing the goal completely. The low-scale effects of
such instigation can be seen today in Ukraine and Hong Kong, while its fullfledged influence to change the regime can be seen in Syria.
In these regime changes, rebellions, and insurgency attempts, media and the
elites or oligarchy of the targeted country also play an important role, since the
elites and media of a country can influence the population. For instance, the
elites can influence the media and even institutes in certain subjects. Also, they
can influence populations and their perspectives regarding leadership. Similarly,
the media, through propaganda and anti-state campaigns, can also sway
populations and institutes into abandoning its leadership. Likewise, the elites
and media campaigns can change the perspective of a population towards
supporting a favored candidate or a puppet leader for the leadership of a targeted
state. This can be achieved by targeting the COG of a population. Depending on
the characteristics of a state, the COG of a population can range from religious
preferences to patriotism or family. For instance, if a campaign chooses to target
the family in a situation where the population places family at its core, then the
chances of success of such a campaign are high. However, if the campaign
chooses to target religion as a core COG of society where people do not place
religion at its inner core, then the chances for the success of such a campaign are
low. Therefore, an aggressor of hybrid warfare first studies the characteristics of
a targeted population, and then makes its moves.71
F. HART’S INDIRECT WARFARE
In 1954, Liddell Hart, in his work The Strategy of Indirect Approach, wrote
that indirect approaches (whether the use of asymmetrical warfare or
psychological operations) of a war are more efficient than direct approaches of
war.72 Hart said:
In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way
home. More and more clearly has the fact emerged that a direct
approach to one’s mental object, or physical objective, along
the line of natural expectation for the opponent, has ever tended
to, and usually produced negative results . . . the dislocation of
the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the
vital prelude to a successful attempt at overthrow. . . . This
dislocation has been produced by a strategic indirect approach,
intentional or fortuitous. It may take varied forms.73
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In color revolutions and unconventional warfare, strategies of hybrid
warfare, an indirect approach that Hart refers to, is utilized. No direct military
confrontation is employed against a targeted state to fight the leaders, to change
the regime, to instigate a revolution, or to propagate misinformation through the
media. From an international law perspective, indirect approaches of hybrid
warfare also save the aggressor from the applicability of international laws
regarding the use of force as defined in the UN Charter, and from the
applicability of the humanitarian laws inscribed in the Geneva Conventions. In
the indirect approach, because no formal military action is used against the target
and the nature of operation is maintained below the threshold of force or armed
attack, the attribution of such aggression is difficult.74 For these reasons, the
most asymmetric attacks by nonstate actors, insurgents, or rebels in a targeted
state are not attributed to an aggressor of hybrid warfare.
The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case established that there is no attribution to a
state unless effective control of nonstate actors by that state is established; this
is known as “the effective control test.”75 In other words, the attribution of an
armed attack to a state is vital to give rise to any responsive use of force in selfdefense.76 Therefore, the employment of the indirect approach is more feasible
for an aggressor because it does not attribute the attack to the aggressor.
Similarly, in cases of propaganda and misinformation by the media, a targeted
nation can be destabilized and chaos instigated without actually employing any
direct use of force. The situation is similar for the application of humanitarian
law in hybrid warfare. In internal conflicts, such as insurgencies, civil wars, or
rebellions, international humanitarian law (IHL) is applicable77 but difficult to
enforce. IHL in such situations is usually enforced upon the targeted state or the
victim state, which restricts the ways that the government can use force on its
own people. However, the use of force by nonstate actors, such as insurgents
and rebels, is largely unaccounted for by IHL. IHL is applicable to nonstate
actors, but insurgents, mercenaries, and rebels employed in hybrid warfare do
not make agreements with governments, other countries, or international
organizations owing to fears of legitimizing NSAs.78 For these reasons, outlaws
freely employ methods of using force that flagrantly violate all IHL. For
example, bomb blasts, mass shootings, and suicide attacks in mosques, schools,
and hospitals are rampant in the societies of victims of hybrid warfare. These are
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orchestrated by insurgents, mercenaries, rebels, and terrorists without any legal
ramifications or IHL enforcement. For example, rebels and terrorists not only
routinely target innocent civilians,79 but they also attack other countries across
borders using missiles, drone attacks, and terrorist attacks.80 By contrast, if a
victim state chooses to retaliate against these outlaws, the media is very quick to
highlight violations of IHL committed by victim governments.81 In sum, IHL is
easily enforced against victim states of hybrid warfare, while aggressors and
their employed outlaws enjoy the inapplicability and non-enforcement of the
same rules.
G. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP
In his OODA loop theory, John Boyd explained that observing, orienting,
deciding, and acting are the vital progressive steps to take the correct retaliatory
action against an attack.82 His framework was initially designed to help fighter
jet pilots. Later on, Robert Greene, a strategist, added that this can also be used
in designing warfare, as well as in other situations.83 The idea of unpredictability
was at the center of this theory: If one’s actions are unpredictable, the enemy or
the target will not be able to orient itself and make the correct decision.84 Modern
color revolutions and unconventional warfare employ this unpredictability
framework by not crafting any foreseeable designs or plan of actions.
Nevertheless, the message to increase recruitment for any color messages is
plain and simple.85
H. CHAOS THEORY
In his 1992 Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought, Steven Mann argued that
the linear and mechanistic strategical framework proposed by Hart and
Clausewitz is validated by conventional warfare, but it had reduced multifaceted
circumstances into a small number of simple variables: military, economics, and
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politics.86 Instead, he believes that warfare has other, nonlinear variables, such
as the environment, technological development, social pressures, religion,
ideology, nonstate actors, and global corporations, to name a few.87 For him,
chaos is the application of these nonlinear dynamics to a society or war. Within
this framework, he sees the implantation of ideology into a targeted population
to direct people’s conflict energy in a favorable direction in the interest of the
strategist. This acts as the human virus in society’s software.88
In hybrid warfare, aggressors and strategists design their human virus in
accordance with what is required to penetrate the system of a targeted nation.
This virus can either point toward a desired candidate—to achieve political
triumph by installing a puppet at a later stage—or it can be a religious
vulnerability that produces chaos in society. This virus in the software will
multiply itself quickly by propagating its ideas, forming swarms to overwhelm
the targeted system, and will then enjoy the blessings of the native elites and the
national and international media. Similar to the OODA loop, the nonlinear
nature of this virus makes it unpredictable, rendering it nearly impossible to be
identified, attacked, or wiped out by the system. Such deliberate introduction of
chaos in a society is known as either constructive89 or creative chaos.90 The
Arab Spring’s color revolutions and the destabilization in Syria and Iraq through
nonstate actors employed this kind of constructive or creative chaos in a grand
strategy of hybrid warfare.91 In its initial stage, in the form of color revolutions,
this virus of chaos spreads in a society to overwhelm the social system. At a later
stage, it coerces a targeted government to step down. However, if the
government chooses not to step down and instead to fight this virus, then
unconventional warfare is unleashed. Combined, the color revolutions and
unconventional warfare form the hybrid warfare which in turn creates systematic
chaos. In practical terms, fully-fledged hybrid warfare as a mixture of color
revolutions and unconventional warfare can be seen in both Syria and Ukraine.92
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I. US FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE STRATEGY
In the U.S. strategy manual Joint Vision 2020,93 the U.S. aims to employ
full-spectrum dominance over communication, military operations, norms,
geopolitics, and human rights rhetoric. 94 The manual says that the U.S.’s
strategic goals are to enable its forces to defeat enemies and to be able to control
any military situation. 95 It also prescribes ways such as color revolutions to
claim geopolitical and social dominance.96 In these color revolutions, a large
number of people are recruited to “challenge a system” and “introduce chaos in
a society” to achieve social dominance by exploiting a number of aspects of the
native population: religion, ideology, psychology, and information. By contrast,
under unconventional warfare in full-spectrum dominance, unconventional and
nonlinear techniques are used to overwhelm the five rings of a targeted state. In
this regard, the armed forces of the victim state have no clue about where to
station its units, because they are unaware of the OODA loop applications in
unconventional warfare, due to the employment of ambiguity.
J. INSURGENCY
The U.S. Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques and
Procedures for Special Forces, FM 31.20-3, 2003 provides insurgency
strategies to be applied in different countries. It outlines foco insurgency,
mass-oriented insurgency, and traditional insurgency, in addition to providing
counterinsurgency techniques. Foco insurgency is described as
[an] Armed cell that emerges from hidden strongholds in an
atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is
the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The
insurgents build new institutions and establish control on the
basis of that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed,
government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is
critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government
loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. The most
famous foco insurgencies were those led by Castro and Che
Guevara. The strategy was quite effective in Cuba because the
Batista regime was corrupt and incompetent. The distinguishing
characteristics of a foco insurgency are the deliberate avoidance
of preparatory organizational work. The rationale is based on
the premise that most peasants are intimidated by the authorities
and will betray any group that cannot defend itself. The
development of rural support as demonstrated by the ability of
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the foco insurgency to strike against the authorities and survive.
The absence of any emphasis on the protracted nature of the
conflict.97
Foco insurgency is a light version of mass-oriented insurgency, which is
oriented toward political, apolitical, or religious insurgent mass population
movements. The aim of such an insurgency is to build an armed system outside
the prevailing system. This insurgency not only opposes a system but also aims
to destroy it. Mass-oriented insurgencies employ nonstate actors in the form of
guerrilla fighters. They operate through active and inactive bases. They are
composed of two wings, one political and the other military, with the aim to
“introduce violence in a society” and “desterilize a state and its institutions.”
They claim legitimacy and operate parallel to a government. They employ
propaganda, start revolutions with political considerations, and enjoy
recruitment, funding, and intelligence. Mass-oriented insurgencies basically
operate from distant, rural areas to avoid law enforcement agencies and only
choose to confront the system by stealth ambush or surprise to overcome the
imbalance in strengths. In their first phase, such insurgencies gather people’s
support. In their second phase, they recruit guerilla fighters, and in their third
phase, they mobilize attacks on the system. The third phase is undertaken when
the insurgency has decided to overwhelm the government or its institutions.98
By contrast, traditional insurgency
normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has
limited aims. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic,
or other similarly identifiable groups. The insurgents perceive
that the government has denied the rights and interests of their
group and work to establish or restore them. They frequently
seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or
semi-autonomy. They seldom specifically seek to overthrow the
government or control the whole society. They generally
respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence
can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism
and guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the
government accedes to the insurgents’ demands. The
concessions the insurgents demand, however, are so great that
the government concedes its legitimacy along with them.99
The FM 31.20-3, 2003 U.S. manual also provides details of how to
undertake counterinsurgency operations, including psychological operations,
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and it outlines how intelligence is gathered during these situations by using infield operatives.100
K. THE LEAD FROM BEHIND THEORY
Due the multi-polar dynamics of this world and nuclear parity, superpowers
cannot initiate or undertake direct conventional warfare to change a regime or
pursue their interests. Previously, in the unipolar international dynamics
involving Iraq and Afghanistan, it was possible to “go it alone.” 101 But this
quick, unipolar policing of the world is winding down.102 In this “leading from
behind” strategy, battle action is done by other allies, by NATO allies,103 or by
proxy state or nonstate actors. The leader instigates things and lets the others do
its dirty work.104 In extreme examples, the real leader does not even participate
in the ground battles but provides material and political support to its allies and
proxies. Such tactics are used to avoid the collateral consequences of war and
decrease the costs of waging a war. The opposite of fighting “leading from
behind” wars is conventional war, such as with the invasions of Afghanistan,
Panama, and Iraq. By contrast, the Libyan, Ukrainian, and Syrian wars can be
considered wars that employed the leading from behind tactic.105 Allies in such
war tactics can also serve as territory for training insurgents, anti-government
insurgents, rebels, proxies, nonstate actors and mercenaries (such as when
Jordan gave medical and training support to nonstate actors fighting in Syria),106
and to channel material support, such as arms, weapons and finances.107
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III. TOOLKIT OF HYBRID WARFARE

The toolkit of hybrid warfare has two parts: (1) the operations by a tool to
increase its vertical potency, and 2) the employment of multiple tools to
diversify it into a horizontal escalation. 108 The list of hybrid warfare tools
includes: the use of propaganda, domestic and international media, social media,
fake news, strategic leaks, funding of organizations, political parties, protests,
oligarchs, religions, cyberwarfare and cyber tools, economic leverage,
proxies/nonstate actors, unacknowledged war (silent warfare), lawfare, and
paramilitary organizations and asymmetric warfare, while targeting
vulnerabilities in a targeted state to achieve certain objectives (such as
destabilizing a nation).109 Hybrid warfare can also use conventional capabilities
(military and firepower) in addition to irregular tactics (rebellion, insurgency,
proxies, and nonstate actors), terrorism (unpredictable violence), criminal
activities (such as the smuggling of weapons, drugs and other illicit things, and
the use of domestic gangs), political means (diplomacy), economic means
(loans, sanctions, and wrecking of an economy), information means
(propaganda, misinformation, leaked information, and other information
operations), and social means (domestic population and psychological
operations).110
A. PROPAGANDA AND MEDIA
Propaganda is employed through fake news and leaked information. Also,
material collected through espionage is advanced through information
operations using domestic and international media channels and social media
outlets, to shape the political discourse or to form the popular narrative of a
society.111 A social narrative can be changed even by altering the subconscious
minds of the general public through a designed seed or virus in movies. For
example, a certain ethnic or religious group can be shown as uncivilized or
terrorist by repeatedly painting its roles in movies as villains, such as Muslims
being shown as terrorists112 and Russians as spies113 and warlords. Similarly,
certain ideas can also be programmed to be seen as normal to instigate violence
in societies. For example, many movies are themed around the propagation of
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revolution,114 where outlaws fighting against law and order are shown as heroes,
because the leaders are corrupt. Such seeds help the aggressor to increase
recruitment to its cause to fight a regime by first painting a targeted regime as
draconian and corrupt and then urging people to rise up as rebels to overturn a
targeted regime. Similarly, social media campaigns against a targeted regime
can propagate leaked information or fake information to instigate protests in a
country.
Propaganda, social media outlets, domestic media, and international media
are exploited to mislead the public into achieving certain interests. For example,
the U.S. media repeatedly broadcast news on the use of chemical weapons by
the Assad regime in Syria (when, in fact, the U.S. has admitted the use of
chemical weapons by U.S.-supported rebels115) and made it appear that Assad is
a tyrannical leader who is killing his own people,116 while not focusing on the
ground realities of U.S. interests in changing the Syrian regime 117 and U.S.
support to Syrian rebels, 118 so that the American people approve the Syrian
invasion and support the U.S. cause. 119 By contrast, fake news is generally
published on social media because publication on social media does not require
verification and it has a huge audience. Sometimes, even conventional media
outlets pick up and publish fake news from social media.120 In Pakistan, fake
news revolves around atrocities against minorities and ethnic groups, dirt on
politicians, against the military, “against India,” and blasphemy. Such
propaganda can easily instigate violence and protests across Pakistan. Strategic
leaks of stolen files and leaked information about properties owned abroad,
personal affairs, and sensitive conversations are also used in election campaigns
to oust a targeted regime and to install a puppet regime in a targeted state.121
B. FUNDING AND CYBERATTACKS
The aggressors in hybrid warfare choose to fund think tanks, political
parties, movements, protests, NGOs, and organizations that suit their interests.
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Such funding can also be made to destabilize a targeted state or to acquire
political leverage against a targeted regime.122 Cyberattacks, cyber espionage
and hacking by using proxy servers are also used as cyberwarfare under the
category of hybrid warfare, to collect information, acquire sensitive files, and
destroy or disarm the weapons of a targeted state.123 This is done so that these
perpetrators do not have to face retribution or attribution. Cyberattacks are even
capable of destroying centrifuges in a nuclear reactor, 124 incapacitate radar
systems,125 and disable government websites and communications.126
C. ECONOMIC LEVERAGE
Economic sanctions, IMF loans, foreign aid, and international finance are
employed as tools to influence the policies of a targeted state’s government. For
instance, the U.S. enjoys great influence over IMF loans and has also often used
economic sanctions as a geopolitical tool to influence nations. However, it is
pertinent to note that economic sanctions and economic leverage understand the
vulnerabilities of a targeted state. For instance, the U.S. Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action for Iran succeeded in forcing Iran to sign a nuclear deal with the
U.S. because Iran’s economy was dependent on foreign buyers of oil and it was
linked with the global economic structure. By contrast, U.S. economic sanctions
did not work well against North Korea for two reasons: first, because it was not
dependent on the world economically, and, second, because China helped North
Korea and acted as an escape from such economic sanctions.127
Economic sanctions, foreign aid, and loans from international organizations
can hardly be considered a modern tool of hybrid warfare because they have
been employed for so many years. What is new is that the global strategic
balance, which has been dominated by the U.S. for the last couple of decades, is
shifting toward a multipolar global economic society, where China is rising as a
new financing giant. In instances where the U.S. targets a nation with economic
sanctions and stops its aid, China comes to the rescue. For example, China
helped North Korea survive U.S. economic sanctions. 128 Similarly, China
planned to invest 62–100 billion USD in Pakistan129 when Pakistan’s economy
was struggling to get international loans, and to invest 400 billion USD in Iran130
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when it was struggling under U.S. economic sanctions.131 In this way, China
brings a balance to the unipolar exploitation of economic leverage.
D. PROXIES
Proxies or nonstate actors, including mercenaries, terrorist organizations,
separatists, insurgents, and rebels, are used in asymmetric warfare against a
targeted state to fight for the aggressors’ national interests. Such strategies and
tools have been widely employed by the U.S. government in Syria to change the
Assad regime. 132 Oftentimes, such support for nonstate actors has gone
unacknowledged to avoid retribution and the attribution of war crimes, war
aggressions, and the use of force. These clandestine means of employing
nonstate actors is referred to as asymmetric warfare,133 and not acknowledging
the support or control of such groups to avoid consequences is termed
unacknowledged war.134
IV. CASE STUDIES

Practically, in hybrid warfare, an instigator of war stirs things up by creating
false flag attacks on a targeted state or on itself.135 The instigator then blames
other countries or groups for materially supporting, orchestrating, or allowing
the use of it’s for these attacks. Such false flag attacks are justified to wage war
against a targeted state. In situations where a false flag attack is made against
the instigator, several targeted states can be blamed. Then, the instigator, by
utilizing different timelines, is to be able to wage wars against these actors. In
doing so, the instigator achieves strategic goals and benefits financially from
their target. The strategic goals can range from stopping other nations from
acquiring nuclear technologies to gaining control of another state’s oil reserves.
The financial gains in such situations either benefit the invader in the form of
captured federal reserve,136 or in the form of looted natural resources.137 The
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sale of ammunition, missiles, bombs, warplanes, tanks, and other forms of
weapons used in hybrid warfare also creates profits by forming militaryindustrial complexes, 138 where the continuation of warfare around the world
translates into increased revenues and business. Furthermore, false flag attacks
on another state also provide both strategic and financial gains to an instigator.
When a war is instigated by strategic hybrid warfare through false flag attacks,
(1) the targeted states are destabilized without having to undertake direct
confrontation, and (2) huge profits are made by selling weapons to one or both
parties to the conflict. 139 There are many instances of false flags attacks,
operations, or plans for hybrid operations that are admitted by governments.
A. RUSSIA
For example, the Russian parliament admitted that in 1940, Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin ordered secret Soviet forces to execute 22,000 Polish army officers
to falsely blame this on the Nazis.140 Similarly, in 1999, the KGB was involved
in the bombings of apartment buildings and blamed Chechnya to justify its
invasion of Chechnya.141 Nonetheless, the perpetuators were apprehended and
sentenced to life imprinsoment.142
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Likewise, the British government admitted that between 1946 and 1948, its
Secret Intelligent Service (SIS) attacked five ships of Jews who were fleeing the
Holocaust and trying to reach Palestine, and had a pseudo-Palestinian group
claim responsibility.143 Similarly, in 1957, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
and President Dwight Eisenhower approved a CIA and MI6 plan to stage a false
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flag attack in Syria to topple the Syrian regime.144 Likewise, a Liberal Democrat
Member of Parliament, Tom Brake, said that during the 2009 G20 protests, he
saw police use undercover officers to incite the crowds to violence.145 Moreover,
the Snowden files revealed that a British spy unit, referred to as the Joint Threat
Research and Intelligence Group, had goals to destroy, degrade, and disrupt
enemies and targets by promoting misinformation and cutting off their
communication. 146 In such operations, forged emails, messages, and
communication are developed to stage that the target is involved147 in terrorist
activity.148 Further, the intelligence forces even employ sex and honey traps to
lure their targets.149
C. ISRAEL
Israel also admitted responsibility for the bombings of several diplomatic
facilities in Egypt, including U.S. buildings in 1954, and blaming locals. The
Israeli spies involved were later arrested and confessed to their crimes. 150
Similarly, government officials also admitted that in 2005, undercover Israeli
officers threw stones at Israeli military officers to instigate violence by Israeli
officers toward a peaceful Palestinian demonstration against the Israeli wall to
justify an armed crackdown against the protest.151
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D. TURKEY
In relation to the 1955 bombings in Greece, a Turkish Court found
Menderes, the then Turkish prime minister, responsible for bombing the Turkish
consulate in Greece. He then blamed Greece and used this incident to justify
anti-Greece violence. 152 Additionally, in 2014, leaked recordings of high
Turkish officials revealed that Turkey was planning to stage a false flag attack
on its own soil to justify a Syrian invasion. In that case, the Turkish national
intelligence chief Hakan Fidan said: “I’ll make up a cause of war by ordering a
missile attack on Turkey; we can also prepare an attack on Suleyman Shah Tomb
if necessary.”153
E. INDONESIA
Indonesian fact-finding investigations found that some of the riots of 1998
were self-provoked by the state Indonesian military.154
F. MACEDONIA
In 2004, Macedonian officials claimed that there was an attack on
Macedonian soil by Pakistani militants who were planning terrorist attacks on
embassies and other sensitive installations, when in fact the murdered people
were illegal militants and had nothing to do with terrorism or armed attacks.155
G. ITALY
Italy admitted that during the 2001 G8 summit, it planted Molotov cocktails
and orchestrated the stabbing of a police officer to justify police brutality against
the ongoing protests.156 Additionally, the Italian prime minister, an Italian judge
and the head of Italian counterintelligence, all admitted that Italy was involved
with NATO secret sleeper cells (Gladio Army) working with the Pentagon, the
CIA, and MI6 all over Europe to carry out terrorist attacks. This was done to
blame the communists and to increase the support of populations against
communism.157 These attacks included the murder of the Turkish Prime Minister
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(1960), bombings in Portugal (1966), the Piazza Fontana massacre in Italy
(1969), terror attacks in Turkey (1971), the Peteano bombing in Italy (1972),
shootings in Brescia, Italy and a bombing on an Italian train (1974), shootings
in Istanbul, Turkey (1977), the Atocha massacre in Madrid, Spain (1977), the
abduction and murder of the Italian Prime Minister (1978), the bombing of the
Bologna railway station in Italy (1980), and shooting and killing 28 shoppers in
Brabant county, Belgium (1985).158 Overall, Gladio is considered responsible
for terrorist attacks in Italy159 and secret wars in the U.S., the U.K., Italy, France,
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway,
Germany, Greece, and Turkey.160
H. UNITED STATES
In total, the U.S. government, through intelligence agencies like the CIA,
has employed unconventional warfare fifty times 161 to change regimes and
invade other countries. Of these fifty instances, it has only admitted to seven.162
For instance, in 2013, the CIA declassified files in which it admitted having had
a role in the 1953 Iranian coup. 163 Likewise, the CIA admitted to its 1950s
staging of bombings in Iran and having the bombers identified as communists to
make the population turn against its own government. 164 Moreover, Senator
George Smathers admitted to having given plans to President Kennedy in the
1960s to stage a false flag attack on the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo to justify
the U.S. invasion in Cuba. 165 Similarly, in 1962, the U.S. military planned
Operation Northwoods to stage a false flag attack on U.S. civilian airplanes to
be able to justify a U.S. invasion in Cuba by blaming Cubans for the attack.166
In 1961, the “Vice President [Lyndon Johnson], [Attorney General] Bob
Kennedy, Secretary [of Defense Robert] McNamara, Dick Goodwin [who was
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs], [head of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Lemnitzer, Wyn Coerr, and Ted Achilles”
proposed to blow up the U.S. consulate to the Dominican Republic to be able to
invade the country. 167 Moreover, with regard to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin
Incident, the U.S. NSA admitted that it fabricated evidence regarding the
incident to make it appear that the Vietnamese attacked the U.S. ships, so that
the Vietnam War could be justified. 168 Furthermore, in 1974 and 1976, the
Church Committee of Congress published fourteen reports on the CIA, the NSA,
and the FBI, in which it admitted U.S. involvement during the 1950s and 1970s
in carrying out terrorist attacks and blaming political activists; it also admitted
U.S. involvement in “attempts to assassinate foreign leaders, particularly Patrice
Lumumba of the Congo, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, the Diem brothers of Vietnam, and General Rene Schneider of Chile.
It also contains findings on the development of a general ‘Executive Action’
capability by the CIA.”169
Moreover, in 1976, Jimmy Carter gave the green light to the military of
Argentina to continue its Dirty War, in which more than 20,000–30,000 170
people (including antigovernment activists and innocent people) were
kidnapped, tortured, and killed.171 In this regard, Patricia Derian commented that
“It sickened me . . . that with an imperial wave of his hand, an American could
sentence people to death.” 172 Moreover, the 1994 US Manual FM 31-20-3
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(unclassified but sensitive), updated in 2004, prescribes ways for its special
forces to stage terrorist attacks and false flag operations and to conceal human
rights abuses and use psychological operations (propaganda) to destabilize
regimes in Latin America.173
Furthermore, CIA director George J. Tenet asserted that the U.S. had plans
to invade Iraq long before the 2001 events of 9/11, and the White House used
“crap” to justify the Iraq invasion. 174 The treasury secretary, Paul O’Neill,
confirmed the assertion that Bush was determined to invade Iraq long before the
9/11 attacks took place.175 Memos in 2001 by Donald Rumsfeld suggested ways
to start Iraqi invasion, for the sole purpose of changing a regime; the suggestions
ranged from Saddam’s connection to 9/11 or an anthrax attack to weapons of
mass destruction.176 The memos included plans to destroy missile sites, cut off
all communications, destroy the Republican Guard, advance on oil fields, seize
the Western desert, secure the border, cut off Baghdad, and deploy forces in Iraq
to change the regime. 177 The U.S. relied on the claim that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks. After
the 9/11 reports, Bush and Dick Cheney admitted to the media that there was no
evidence to prove that Iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks.178 Similarly, intelligence
reports such as the Chilcot Report concluded that the intelligence did not
establish “beyond doubt” that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.179
Moreover, Tyler Drumheller, the former chief of the CIA Europe division,
revealed that Bush and Cheney and the national security adviser, Condoleezza
Rice, were personally told by the CIA director, George J. Tenet, that Iraq had no
weapons of mass destruction.180 Richard Durbin, a Democrat and member of the
Intelligence Committee, also admitted that he knew that the American people
were misled about the Iraq invasion, but he kept quiet because he was sworn to
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secrecy.181 The CIA claimed that it warned the White House that the documents
it was using to justify the Iraq invasion were forged.182 Paul O’Neil said that: “I
never saw anything that I would characterize as evidence of weapons of mass
destruction. … I never saw anything in the intelligence that I would characterize
as real evidence.”183 This all supports that the intelligence and justification for
invading Iraq were fixed on U.S. policy.184 Additionally, it demonstrates that the
Iraq invasion was launched on a false pretext and claims that Iraq was involved
in the 9/11 or an anthrax attack, and that it possessed weapons of mass
destruction. 185 In reality, the evidence shows that Republican Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel admitted the U.S. had fought for the benefit of big oil.186
Similarly, in the Syrian War, the official stance of the White House was not
that it was using force in Syria pursuant to armed attack in its territory, in selfdefense, or pursuant to UNSC authorization by the United Nations Security
Council (the only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under UN
Charter).187 Instead, it says that the US was using force in Syria to “to further its
important national interests,”188 and to deter the use of chemical weapons by the
Syrian state. 189 The U.S. admitted to having supported and trained Syrian
rebels190 and nonstate actors to change the Assad regime.191 Under international
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law, armed support to rebels and nonstate actors—and effective control of
nonstate actors in case of the use of force by them in the sovereign territory of a
country—can be considered aggression and the use of force, 192 which is
prohibited under the UN Charter.193
V. COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

To counter hybrid warfare, a victim state should react in a series of three
stages. First, it should detect that hybrid warfare has been waged against it, and
assess its own vulnerabilities. Second, it should deter hybrid warfare; third, it
should respond to the threat posed by hybrid warfare. 194 Though with some
variations, NATO also includes elements of detect, deter, and defend in its
strategy to fight hybrid warfare.195
A. DETECT
The first step in countering hybrid warfare is for a victim state to detect the
vulnerabilities196 of its own society. In doing this, a state should examine its
system, its social structure, its defense, its legal framework, any sensitive
sentiments of the population that can be exploited by aggressors, and any gray
areas from which hybrid warfare can operate. Thereafter, to detect hybrid
warfare, warning intelligence (which is composed of military and intelligence
capabilities) should be employed to acquire information regarding possible
hybrid warfare attacks, media and social media campaigns, movements,
propaganda, and information operations working toward an enemy’s interest, by
using indicator-based methods. 197 Pakistan should detect its national
vulnerabilities and should link them to the hypothesis that such vulnerabilities
can be used to advance enemy interests. In this regard, it can develop warning
indicators and devise counter actions to restrain them. For example, the U.S. has
started to collect information on its own citizens to analyze indicators which will
enable it to detect hybrid warfare in its early stages. The U.S. government has
been doing this by following people’s Internet footprints. 198 Similarly, the
Finnish and British governments have also devised systems to map out patterns
of anomalies, which can detect information warfare, propaganda, and hybrid
warfare operations and movements.199
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B. DETER
Deterrence weakens hybrid warfare operations. A cost-benefit analysis is
done to assess the probabilities of succeeding in a task, which helps to
understand what a society can lose or gain by making certain decisions against
hybrid operations. It includes a cost analysis of allocated government resources,
enemy losses, and the capabilities of a system to fight such threats.200 First, the
victim state should inquire: whom to deter, why to deter, and what to deter.201
Then it must apply the designed deterrence framework. Deterrence can be
achieved either by denial, in which the existence of any threat is denied, to
undermine the enemy’s efforts, or it can be carried out through deterrence by
punishment, in which the enemy is informed of the consequences of its
actions.202 A government should make small-gain goals. These are target assets
that are important to further hybrid threats, and focus on key actors in such
movements. For these purposes, a victim state can employ political, economic,
intelligence, military, social media, informational, and infrastructural means to
fight such threats.203
C. RESPOND
Resilience and deterrence are less effective against hybrid threats and they
are discussed and employed in the literature in greater detail. However,
unforeseen consequences as a response to hybrid threats are not only
unpredictable; they also discourage hybrid warfare and fight it effectively.204 For
instance, levying heavy sanctions, including fines against targeted groups,
outlets, and platforms, is an effective and nonviolent way to fight hybrid threats.
Such assertive responses prevent further hybrid attacks and help to achieve stateoriented strategic interests. Responses should be proportionate to the attacks.
Thus, they should have small, targeted aims, and should set thresholds and
periodical reviews to analyze their appropriateness and performance.
After setting thresholds, reviewing systems, and aims to respond, a victim
state should devise policy choices about whether it wishes to engage or
disengage with a hybrid threat. Engaging with a hybrid threat is done by an
assertive response, but such a response has the consequence of validating the
effect of a threat. However, by disengaging with a threat, hybrid threats are
shown as a nonmalignant threat to an enemy. Then, a state should consider
whether it chooses to act internally against domestic outlets and actors or against
international adversaries. States should consider the limits of international law
and its gray areas, through which an enemy can work. After this, a state must
choose whether it should employ overt conventional forces to respond, or covert
intelligence to respond. A response can be either coercive, with assertive
measures, or it can be inductive, to stimulate cooperation. An inductive response
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contemplates the inner and outward vulnerabilities of its own state, its own
people, and its enemies205
In a battle of narratives and hybrid warfare, a responding victim state can
also unite its efforts to fight hybrid threats. It can do this by strengthening its
national media, controlling fake news or misinformation, supporting quality
content and quality content writers and outlets, developing content sharing
platforms with partner countries, developing mechanisms to identify
misinformation and political trolling, strengthing domestic institutions
responsible for counterinformation operations, reviewing media content, and
introducing media and digital education and literacy.206
CONCLUSION

Hybrid warfare campaigns are primarily initiated in cyberspace, because in
the cyber world it is very difficult to locate the origin of a movement, which
renders it impossible for the targeted state to respond to aggression. This reality
helps the aggressor avoid the targeted state’s detection. It also shields the
attacker from being held responsible for violations of international law. Hybrid
warfare campaigns are nonlinear in both their vertical and horizontal spheres.
Therefore, hybrid warfare is unpredictable, which helps it escape detection until
it is in full force.207 Moreover, it is flexible, which allows it to change its course
of operation, to escalate easily, to change targets, to de-escalate and efficiently
achieve its target objectives—which is to either change a targeted state’s regime
or to destabilize it. 208 The key objectives for hybrid warfare are to avoid direct
confrontation, to destabilize a targeted state, and to hinder its policymaking.209
In this regard, a full spectrum of tools are employed to introduce chaos and
exercise ambiguity to spread confusion, while avoiding attribution and
retribution against the actions of perpetrators.210 All efforts are synchronized to
either change a regime or to influence or coerce it into conditions that are
favorable to the aggressor.211
Hybrid warfare is composed of two basic pillars. One is the color revolution
and the other is unconventional warfare. In color revolutions, psychological
operations, information operations, and propaganda are employed to convey a
designed message (usually antigovernment) to mass audiences.212 At this stage
of hybrid warfare, the vulnerabilities of a society or state are targeted, networks
are developed, media and other information outlets are positioned to influence
targeted masses, local separatist movements are supported, politicians and other
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key establishment actors are bribed, dissatisfaction with the central authority is
induced, local oligarchs, and armed bands are contracted, anti-state interest
movements, marches, and protests are designed and commenced, infrastructure
and institutions are targeted, violence is provoked, misinformation and
psychological operations are started, monopolies in the media are established,
domestic conventional forces are disabled, and a parallel sovereignty or a
parallel state is erected and claimed.213 The chief purpose of such activities is to
destabilize a government and change the regime or to subvert the authority of
the established government. The message of these actions instigates violence
and convinces its participants to fight against the system (neocortical warfare).
The destabilizations of Syria and the Arab Spring214 are examples of such color
revolutions. Color revolution techniques involve public movements, protests,
marches, social or civil disobedience, boycotts, anticorruption movements, antistate movements, nonviolent seizures, parallel sovereignty and government
claims, state mocking, false identities, and guerilla warfare (in addition to these
nonviolent techniques, violent unconventional techniques can also be used by
insurgents or rebels).215
Unconventional warfare is the next stage of color revolutions. In this stage,
terrorism and unpredictable force are used, key government institutions are
disabled, the territory of the state is occupied, armed forces are prominently
positioned, and asymmetric guerrilla warfare is commenced against a targeted
state.216 The main aim of such activities is to change the regime of the targeted
state by employing nonstate actors or to destabilize the state by use of violence.
Some of the most renowned uses of nonstate actors involve their employment as
mercenaries, terrorists, and anti-state rebels. 217 These nonstate actors use
Warden’s five rings, Hart’s indirect approach, Boyd’s OODA loop, and chaos
theory to paralyze a targeted victim. 218 Notable examples of such
unconventional warfare are the Ukrainian and EuroMaidan coups and the Syrian
War, and it is predicted that such movements will continue to be planned and
executed in the future.219
Within geopolitics and the theoretical framework of hybrid warfare,
Mackinder identified Russia as at the center of the Heartland of the World Island.
Cohen and Spykman located its vulnerabilities. Pilsudski provided methods to
break it up through destabilization, and Brzezinski used all of these learnings to
provide a geostrategy for the U.S. to maintain its dominance. So, Korybko is of
the view that the American strategy is to penetrate the Russian core and the
Chinese core through destabilization to retain its global hegemonic
dominance.220 For Korybko, the American strategy for destabilizing cores in
Eurasia is not to repeat situations like Libya for financial and political reasons.
Instead, it aims to destabilize peripheral states like Kazakhstan and Ukraine by
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civil conflict, regime change movements, and insurgency or antigovernment
movements through propaganda. 221 In such clandestine wars against a target
state, there are five levels of targets stacked in layers upon each other. At the
very core is (1) the leadership of the country, and above this (2) the system
essentials, (3) infrastructure, and (4) the population. The outermost layer is (5)
fielded military.222 As you hit closer to the core of these targets, you will reap
more significant impacts. Such clandestine measures are undertaken by an
aggressor, because indirect approaches (whether the use of asymmetrical
warfare or psychological operations) of a war are more efficient than
conventional approaches of war.223 Because indirect approaches are difficult to
detect, they also save an aggressor from attribution or retribution.224 Moreover,
in cases of propaganda and misinformation by the media, a targeted nation can
be destabilized and chaos can be instigated in the target state without actually
using any direct use of force and without exhausting many resources. In hybrid
warfare,225 unpredictability is at the center of its movements, because it does not
allow its victim to orient itself and respond accordingly. 226 Its nonlinear
variables include elements of the environment, technological development,
social pressure, religion, ideology, nonstate actors, and global corporations.227
Within these factors, an ideology is implanted into a targeted population to direct
people’s conflict energy in a favorable direction, as per the interest of the
strategist as a human virus in the society’s software.228
The list of hybrid warfare tools includes the use of propaganda, domestic
media, international media, social media, fake news, strategic leaks, funding of
organizations, use of political parties, protests, oligarchs, religions, cyberwarfare
and cyber tools, economic leverage, proxies or nonstate actors, unacknowledged
war (silent warfare), lawfare, and paramilitary organizations and asymmetric
warfare, while targeting vulnerabilities in the targeted state to achieve certain
objectives (such as destabilizing a nation). 229 It can also use conventional
capabilities (military and firepower) in addition to irregular tactics (rebellion,
insurgency, proxies, and nonstate actors), terrorism (unpredictable violence),
criminal activities (such as smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other illicit things,
and the use of domestic gangs), political means (diplomacy), economic means
(loans, sanctions, and wrecking of the economy), informational means
(propaganda, misinformation, leaked information, and other information
operations), and social means (domestic population and psychological
operations).230
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In hybrid warfare, an instigator of war stirs things up by creating false flag
attacks on a targeted state or on itself,231 and blames other countries for either
materially supporting, orchestrating, or letting its territory be used for these
attacks. Such false flag attacks are then justified to wage a war against a targeted
state. In situations where a false flag attack is on the instigator itself, a number
of targeted states can be blamed in different timelines to be able to wage war
against them for gaining strategic goals and benefitting financially from the
attacks. The strategic goals can range from stopping other nations from acquiring
nuclear technologies to gaining control of oil reserves in a targeted state, or to
changing or influencing a regime. Further, false flag attacks on other states also
provide strategic and financial gains to the instigator. For example, targeted
states are destabilized without having to undertake direct confrontation and huge
profits232 are made by selling weapons to one or both parties to the conflict.
There are many instances of false flag attacks, operations, or plans for hybrid
operations that are admitted to by instigator governments.
To counter such hybrid threats, a victim state should act in three ways. First,
it should detect that there is hybrid warfare waged against it and it must also
detect its own vulnerabilities. Second, it should deter hybrid warfare; third, it
should respond to threats posed by hybrid warfare. 233 A government should
make small goals, should target assets important for enemy movements, and
focus on its key actors. A victim state in hybrid war aggression should also
discern intent, capability, and attribution of such operations, and detect the
vulnerabilities of its enemy to be able to exploit them.234 A victim should be
unpredictable toward its enemy as well and should set thresholds on its
responses. Unforeseen consequences and hybrid responses to hybrid threats are
not only unpredictable but also effective and discourage hybrid warfare.235 For
instance, levying heavy sanctions, including fines, against targeted groups,
outlets, and platforms is an effective and nonviolent way to fight hybrid threats.
As a response in a battle of narratives, or hybrid warfare, a victim state can also
unite its efforts to fight hybrid threat. It can do so by strengthening its national
media, controlling fake news or misinformation, supporting quality content and
quality content writers and outlets, developing content sharing platforms with
partner countries, “develop[ing] [a] mechanism to identify misinformation and
political trolling,” “strengthen[ing] domestic institutions responsible for counter
information operations and review media content,” and introducing media and
digital education and literacy.236
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